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European Parliament elections in May 2019 come at a critical time in the evolution of the 
EU as these will be the first elections after the expected departure of the UK (March 2019) 
and at a time when divergence on many issues characterises member state relations. 
Wider global developments weigh heavily on Europe with the return of hard 
geopolitics and efforts to undermine the global multilateral order. The European 
University Institute (EUI) wants to highlight the major issues that are at the heart of the 
political agenda at this juncture as a contribution to the debate. The papers are part of 
a wider programme on the elections including the development of a Voting Advice 
Application (VAA), euandi2019, and an online tool specifically tailored for mobile EU 
citizens voting either in their country of citizenship or residence, spaceu2019.
This initiative on the European Parliament elections in 2019 is part of the Schuman 
Centre’s European Governance and Politics Programme (EGPP) egpp.eui.eu. Launched in 
2018, the Programme aims to foster high-quality academic research and reflection on 
the European Union and European integration with a medium to long-term perspective. 
The EGPP also promotes engagement on contemporary issues through various events, 
including blog debates and thematic conferences and workshops.
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, created in 1992 and currently directed by 
Professor Brigid Laffan, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research on the major 
issues facing the process of European integration, European societies and Europe’s place in 21st 
century global politics. 
The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes, 
projects and data sets, in addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research 
agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing 
agenda of European integration, the expanding membership of the European Union, developments 
in Europe’s neighbourhood and the wider world. 
For more information: http://eui.eu/rscas 
The Policy Paper Series of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies complements its 
Working Papers Series. This series aims to disseminate the views of a person or a group on a 
particular policy matter, specifically in the field of European integration. 
The European University Institute and the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies are 
not responsible for the proposals and opinions expressed by the author(s). 
The aim of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies is to contribute to the public debate 
by offering views and opinions on matters of general interest. 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s). 
  
Abstract 
Our analysis first briefly outlines the growth of Social Europe, from its origins focused on what we call 
Social Europe for Workers to a much broader focus. It shows how increased attention to Social Europe 
in the Lisbon Treaty, including in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, was not matched by the EU’s 
actions, which instead were characterized by a series of regressive moves across a range of EU 
institutions. It then considers the genesis, status and debate around the European Pillar of Social Rights, 
showing that it has been accompanied by renewed EU activity. At the same time, we suggest that the 
Pillar is insufficient to provide a tangible human face for Social Europe in the new context of migration 
and the legacies of the economic crisis. We argue that binding EU commitments to minimum pay and 
income and to addressing inequalities are now needed. We conclude by briefly surveying the options 
for developing Social Europe over the next five years: in the use of competences; in macro-economic 
governance; in EU spending; and going outside the Treaties to overcome blockages and limits.  
Keywords 
Social Europe; Lisbon Treaty; European Pillar of Social Rights; new binding EU floors for pay and 
income. 
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1. The growth of Social Europe and the failed promise of the Lisbon Treaty  
In the twentieth century, the social component of the EU had a clear profile when contrasted with 
definitions of social policy at the national level. It focused mainly on improving and protecting the rights 
of workers, both in (i) the market integration project per se, by ensuring the free movement of workers 
(and their families) and job-seekers within the European Union, and in (ii) protecting the rights of all 
workers, including their health and safety, their working time and, centrally, the rights of women not to 
be discriminated against at work. A level of member state consensus (with just one outlier member state 
after 1979), empowered and adept supranational policy entrepreneurs in the European Commission and 
judicial dialogue via the preliminary reference procedure led to a worker-focused social acquis. We 
might call this Social Europe for Workers. This focus was an essential part of underpinning the 
legitimacy of the EU project at the time, giving it what Michael Shanks, Commission Director-General 
of Social Affairs in the 1970s, called a ‘human face.’ 
As the EU project became much more capacious after the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, so 
too did the EU’s social component. First, Social Europe moved beyond work. It became focused on a 
much wider range of welfare and social issues than just workers and their families. Health, education, 
pensions, housing and social inclusion all became objects of EU policy activity. At the same time, much 
of the expanded EU activity was taking place outside the Social Policy Chapter of the Treaty. For 
instance, a significant new corpus of legislation on work and social entitlements came via EU migration 
and asylum law.  
The Lisbon Treaty gave a more prominent place to the social dimension of the integration process. 
Article 3 TEU, which lists the overall objectives of the EU, commits the EU to work for “a highly 
competitive social market economy, aiming for full employment and social progress” and a 
mainstreaming social clause was written in Article 9 TFEU, according to which “In defining and 
implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall take into account requirements linked to the 
promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against 
social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and protection of human health.” Perhaps the 
most significant change came with the introduction of a written, and binding, Charter of Fundamental 
Rights into primary EU law. The Solidarity Chapter of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Articles 
27-33) mainly covers labour rights and some welfare rights (social security and assistance, healthcare, 
education and housing); discrimination and gender equality are in a separate Equality Chapter. The 
Charter of Fundamental Rights has its own mainstreaming clause in Article 51(1), which states that the 
Union’s institutions, and the member states when implementing Union law, shall “promote the 
application” of Charter rights “in accordance with their respective powers.” As the Charter itself does 
not create new competences for the Union, this means that in the exercise of the other competences of 
the Union the EU institutions must promote the application of the fundamental rights of the Charter. In 
other words, fundamental rights must be integrated in all domains of EU law. 
In the years after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, a contrast emerged between what the 
Treaties and the Charter seemed to promise and the concrete policies of the EU in the social field. Not 
much happened after 2009. In 2013, the Commission launched its Social Investment Package, and there 
was a brief spell of law-making in 2014 (at the end of the previous Commission and EP’s term) with the 
adoption of four social policy directives: directive 2014/67 on the enforcement of the posted workers 
directive, directive 2014/54 on facilitating the exercise of the right of free movement of workers, 
directive 2014/50 on the portability of supplementary pension rights and the seasonal workers directive, 
2014/36. The latter gave seasonal workers equal treatment with host state workers for a series of labour 
and social security rights including working conditions and industrial action, but their admittance to the 
labour market of the host country was made subject to having a work contract, guarantees of sickness 
insurance, adequate accommodation and exclusion of recourse to the host-state social assistance system.  
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Whilst not many new policy initiatives were taken in the post-Lisbon years, there was even evidence 
of social regression in the context of the EU’s macro-economic governance because of the way this 
governance developed during the financial crisis years. The social and employment Open Methods of 
Coordination lost their autonomy and became incorporated in a macroeconomic European Semester 
with strong fiscal consolidation and deregulatory messages, which was seen as threatening the integrity 
of national social protection. Moreover, the specific social and labour requirements imposed on the 
‘programme countries’ as part of loan conditions or of ECB bond purchase programmes were causing a 
dismantling of national labour and social protections in these countries.  
During those same years, the Court of Justice gave some judgments that moved away from the 
progressive and protective approach which had marked its earlier jurisprudence towards a protection-
limiting interpretation of EU social rights and guarantees. These consisted in: limiting the rights of 
posted workers and of collective action to protect workers’ rights in cross-border situations; limiting its 
earlier jurisprudence on the social rights accorded to mobile EU citizens; and providing new non-
progressive readings of some elements of the legislative labour acquis through a range of interpretative 
devices, including extensive application of the fundamental freedoms and invocation of the freedom to 
conduct a business as a fundamental right protected by the EU Charter of Rights counteracting – and 
prevailing over – the social rights contained in the Charter.  
All these varied EU developments, coming from a wide range of EU actors, were seen as leading to 
a regression of the Social Europe idea, and as a failure to live up to the promise of social progress 
contained in the Lisbon Treaty reform. Just as importantly, they demonstrate that a return to the status 
quo ante, whereby the EU asserts it has a limited role to play in national social policy, is difficult to 
sustain politically. 
2. The potential role of the Pillar of Social Rights in advancing a European social policy 
agenda  
More recently, Social Europe is again becoming a prominent part of the effort to provide a ‘human face’ 
for the EU. The European Pillar of Social Rights, an initiative of the Juncker Commission, can be seen 
as a response to the weakening of social rights required by EU institutions during the sovereign debt 
crisis, and also as part of a response to broader populist challenges to the EU project. In his State of the 
Union address to the European Parliament on 9 September 2015, Commission president Juncker 
proposed the establishment of what he was then the first person to call a ‘European Pillar of Social 
Rights.’  
This project emerged from the context of Economic and Monetary Union. It was meant to create a 
‘fairer’ EMU, in reaction to the social justice deficit in EMU convergence and conditionality policies. 
During the broad consultation process that took place in 2016, it became clear that there was no 
convincing reason to tie the Pillar to the EMU and to the eurozone, and by the time the Pillar was 
‘proclaimed’ by the EU institutions at the Gothenburg summit in November 2017 it had a broader scope, 
and it aimed at the broader objective of re-launching the social dimension of the European Union. It was 
addressed to all EU member states and not just the eurozone states.  
The term pillar reminds one of the second and third pillars created by the Maastricht Treaty, which 
were separate institutional ‘worlds’ with their own forms of decision-making, policy instruments and 
accountability. This is clearly not the case here. The Pillar does not create new institutions or decision-
making rules for the social field. The French term for ‘pillar’ is ‘socle,’ i.e. pediment, which is a more 
appropriate one as it harks back to the old idea of a Europe-wide floor of rights, which is in fact what 
the Pillar seeks to establish.  
The Pillar comprises a list of twenty items arranged in three thematic Chapters: equal opportunities 
and access to the labour market; fair working conditions; and social protection and inclusion. Each item 
has a title referring to a particular subject (such as wages, work-life balance, minimum income, long-
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term care, etc.). The word ‘right’ is not used in these titles but appears in the formulation of almost all 
the items. For example, item 12 entitled ‘Social protection’ is formulated as follows: “Regardless of the 
type and duration of their employment relationship, workers, and, under comparable conditions, the self-
employed, have the right to adequate social protection.” And item 18, entitled ‘Long-term care’ goes as 
follows: “Everyone has the right to affordable long-term care services of good quality, in particular 
home-care and community-based services.” 
However, none of these rights are directly enforceable before a court. Recital 14 of the Pillar’s 
preamble states “for them to be legally enforceable, the principles and rights require dedicated measures 
or legislation to be adopted at the appropriate level.” This is perhaps self-evident, given that the Pillar 
is a soft law document, but it would have been better to include this sentence in the main text of the 
Pillar so as to dispel the impression that it is a true legally binding human rights instrument. The use of 
rights language not being matched with the enforceability that normally comes with such language has 
led commentators to wonder whether the Pillar offers any added value compared to the EU’s Charter of 
Rights. As we already have a set of fundamental social rights in the Charter, why did we need another 
proclamation if it has no concrete legal consequences? Worse still, isn’t there a danger of eroding the 
value of the Charter by replacing a set of binding rights that are part of primary EU law with a set of 
vague programmatic commitments?  
The answer to this objection could be that, since the policy-activating potential of the Charter has 
remained unused so far, the Pillar could actually help with the “duty to promote” the rights in the Charter 
because they are spelt out in somewhat greater detail in the Pillar, and it also adds some further rights 
and principles that are not in the Charter. The Commission’s hope, expressed in recital 12 of the Pillar’s 
preamble, is that it will “serve as a guide towards efficient employment and social outcomes … and 
towards ensuring better enactment and implementation of social rights.” In some documents, it also 
refers to the Pillar “as a compass for a renewed process of convergence.” For Marianne Thyssen, the 
current commissioner for social affairs, the Pillar is now the background to all the Commission’s 
initiatives on employment and social affairs, and it sets out a new social agenda for the Union as a kind 
of late response to the promise contained in the Lisbon Treaty.   
However, this compass is not only meant to guide the Union’s policy but also that of its member 
states. The crucial passage in this respect is again to be found in the preamble rather than in the main 
text of the Pillar. According to recital 17, this is “a shared political commitment and responsibility” that 
“should be implemented at both Union level and member state level within their respective 
competences” and to hammer in this point the next recital states that the Pillar “does not entail an 
extension of the Union’s powers and tasks as conferred by the Treaties. It should be implemented within 
the limits of those powers.”  
The Commission has made legislative and non-legislative proposals that are explicitly presented as 
“implementing” the pillar. Its proposal for a work-life balance directive (extending parental and 
caretaking leave) can be seen as a direct implementation of item 9 (although the reality is that this item 
was prominently displayed in the Pillar because the Commission had already prepared a draft directive 
on the subject). The Commission also made a proposal for a Council recommendation on access to social 
protection for workers on atypical contracts and for the self-employed, and it proposed the creation of a 
European Labour Authority (a new EU agency) charged with facilitating and monitoring labour mobility 
between EU countries. 
It seems that the Pillar, and its proclamation by the three institutions, has given new impetus and 
political energy. In June 2018, agreement was reached in the Council on three legislative files: revision 
of the coordination of social security systems, the draft directive on work-life balance, and the draft 
directive on transparent and predictable working conditions. In addition, the new posted workers 
directive 2018/957 was adopted, although it is not formally part of the Pillar programme. In its 2019 
work programme the Commission is considering whether to propose a move from unanimity to qualified 
majority voting in three areas of social policy: dismissal protection, collective defence of workers and 
Claire Kilpatrick and Bruno De Witte 
4 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Policy Papers 
employers, and social security and protection for workers. It remains to be seen whether this new 
political energy will last beyond the coming European election and the appointment of a new 
Commission. 
3. Beyond the Pillar: A Tangible Human Face for Social Europe 
Nonetheless, the Pillar process to date shows that the initiatives the EU most needs today to visibly 
address the concerns of those living and working within it are ones it currently fails to supply. It is 
unlikely that the Pillar will provide a sense to EU voters, rather than to Brussels insiders, that the EU is 
acting to underpin social rights in a Union struggling to cope with the stresses resulting from increased 
migration, mobility and economic crisis. 
To visibly and clearly address problems of economic insecurity for individuals and families across 
the enlarged EU, some of which arise from sovereign debt crisis management, and which feed wider 
social and political unrest, the EU should act to guarantee a minimum income and minimum pay. 
Building on this floor, it should act with the Member States to address widening inequalities. Such a 
floor and commitment to address inequalities would make EU demands to respect budgetary limits, as 
recently seen in Italy, both more legitimate and effective.   
One problem facing EU-level action is that its current legal competences in the social field are limited 
and fragmented. Even in the core legal basis for EU action, Article 153 TFEU, there is a disjunction 
between areas in which the EU can adopt measures of minimum harmonisation of national law (namely, 
in large parts of labour law) and areas in which it can only take a coordinating and funding role (namely 
regarding some aspects of social protection and inclusion). Article 153 also excludes some core areas of 
labour law, namely pay, the right to association and the right to strike. 
The EU competence limit can be illustrated by the question of minimum income. In 2012 the 
European Commission refused to register a Citizen’s Initiative called Unconditional Basic Income on 
the ground that the EU lacked the competence to enact a right to a minimum income. Combating social 
exclusion may well be an EU objective, but EU law-making on that subject is not allowed by Art 153 
TFEU, so the Commission argued. A similar initiative (Vite l’Europe sociale!) was rejected on the same 
grounds in 2014. However, in January 2017 at the High-Level meeting concluding the consultations on 
the Pillar, Juncker committed to an EU guarantee of both minimum pay and income. One of the most 
resonant proposals to come out of the consultation process of 2016 was that of the Social Policy Platform 
(a grouping of 30 social NGOs) advocating an EU framework minimum income directive. It was argued 
that the Treaties do contain a sufficient legal basis for such a directive, namely in Article 153(1)(h), 
which allows for binding legal measures for the integration of persons excluded from the labour market. 
The text of the Pillar includes both a minimum wage (item 6b: “Adequate minimum wages shall be 
ensured…”) and a minimum income (item 14), but the Commission does not seem convinced that the 
EU can take legal action. At any rate, it has not so far promised to take any concrete action on these 
subjects. It seems that this is entrusted entirely to Member State action. Thus, some of the ‘star’ 
principles of the Pillar, the ones that Juncker had highlighted in his interventions, cannot, apparently, be 
realized by the EU.  
4. The future of social policy beyond the 2019 election 
A number of questions arise for the future of social policy beyond May 2019. At the same time, some 
desirable directions are apparent. The biggest risk we foresee is that of doing too little. 
Will the Union make more active use of the limited law-making competences that the Treaties gave 
it so as to effectively implement a number of the items in the Pillar? In this context, can the Commission 
limit itself to proposing non-binding recommendations to the Member States (as it recently did for access 
to social protection) or should it be more ambitious and propose a true minimum harmonisation? Our 
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suggestion is that where limits on social competences, including the exclusion of legislating on pay, 
strikes and freedom of association in Article 153(5) TFEU, block action vital to underpinning Social 
Europe in a new context, they should be revisited or worked around.  
Turning to macro-economic governance, how can the EU ensure it will no longer undermine national 
welfare regimes and national systems of labour relations, but on the contrary underpin them while 
respecting ‘national social spaces’ (as Ferrera puts it)? Support in EU law and policies, including the 
European Semester, for union membership and activities within inclusive collective bargaining 
structures is a central means of underpinning democracy and credibly addressing income inequality and 
insecurity at work and has a clear Treaty basis in Article 156 TFEU. The widening and striking regional 
income inequalities within states from the 1980s onwards could also usefully become a more sustained 
focus of analysis and EU policy activity. Could future reforms of EMU lead to the creation of a European 
unemployment insurance system which could simultaneously strengthen the economic stability of the 
eurozone and enact a limited form of social solidarity among the euro countries? 
According to the Commission, the European Social Fund+ for the new multiannual budget period 
2021-2027 will “support the delivery” of the Pillar and will be “geared towards making the principles 
of the [Pillar] a reality on the ground.” It remains to be seen whether this ambition will survive the 
budget negotiations and how it will be operationalized, maybe by earmarking parts of the Fund for 
concrete national and local projects implementing Pillar rights. 
Finally, one should consider the resources offered by enhanced cooperation to overcome the 
resistance of some member states. In addition, when there are doubts about the legal permissibility of 
EU action it would be possible to put in place new forms of social protection by means of international 
agreements between all, or a group of, member states. The possibility of concluding a separate 
agreement between a group of ‘willing and able’ states has been experimented in the past in the area of 
free movement (Schengen) and financial stability (European Stability Mechanism, Fiscal Compact). 
Could such an approach also be used to implement the Pillar by means of the adoption of a ‘Social 
Compact’? 
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